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Abstract 
Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. 
However, at the same time, independent directors commonly engage in numerous outside 
activities potentially reducing their time and commitment with the particular firm. Using 
Tobin’s Q as an approximation of market valuation and controlling for endogeneity, our 
empirical analysis reveals that neither is independence positively related to firm performance 
nor are outside activities negatively related to it. Nevertheless, we find that ― non-
independent ― executive directors, former executives and family representatives have a 
positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. Conversely, ― independent ― outside executives are 
negatively related with firm valuation. Moreover, the study indicates that the frequency and 
duration of meetings are negatively affected by the fraction of executive directors on the 
board. Insiders potentially reduce the need for meetings because of their specialist 
competence. The results therefore invalidate rules advocating independent directors and 
oppose the engagement of directors with significant outside activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Most economists agree that a board of directors’ essential duty is to ensure that a firm is led in 
the shareholders’ best interests. The board of directors is positioned between a firm’s top 
management and its shareholders who typically have insufficient ownership to influence firm 
policies. Therefore, prescriptive legislation imposes serious responsibilities on directors and 
defines the public expectation of their performance. Two important responsibilities of the 
board of directors are the monitoring and advising of the top management. The first task, 
which is rooted in agency theory, stresses the importance of the director’s role in solving the 
principal-agent conflict between managers and shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Fama and Jensen 1983). In this context, the board’s independence from management is 
crucial. The second task emphasizes the importance of the director’s role providing ties with 
the external business environment and professional specialist skills (for example, strategic 
planning). This latter responsibility is associated with outside activities (for example, outside 
directorships, executive positions or political engagements) of directors and is based on 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, these two roles are subject 
to trade-offs. 
The first trade-off relates to the position (or independence) of the board vis-à-vis the top 
management. Board directors need sufficient information about the daily business and risks of 
the firm to do a proper job. The information asymmetry between the management and the 
board of directors can be reduced by continuing communication of the two parties. Executive 
directors (insiders) can close this gap. However, insiders virtually supervise themselves and 
executive directors may be too involved in daily business, so that their view may conflict with 
an outside, more neutral, perspective. In addition, also a close relationship, friendship or even 
dependence on the chief executive officer (CEO) and his executive board can impair the 
board’s independence and lead to collusion and conflicts of interest. For instance, 
compromised board decisions may involve executives being replaced too late or paid too 
much, counter to shareholder interests (Adams and Ferreira 2007). This is particularly 
difficult where the CEO has a lot of decision-making power as in the nomination of new 
directors (see Shivdasani and Yermack 1999).  
As a consequence of these potential imbalances, regulators, proxy advisors and 
shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. 1  The literature traditionally 
                                                          
1 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 Section 301(m)(3)(A): "In general — Each member of the 
audit committee of the issuer shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall 
otherwise be independent." This direct and exogenous impact led to a reduction of insiders on U.S. 
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classifies board members as insiders and outsiders (see Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; 
Yermack 2004). Executive directors are commonly defined as being insiders, while non-
executive directors are denominated as being outsiders. Nevertheless, not all of these 
outsiders are independent. Such directors are often referred to as "grey" or "affiliated" 
directors. As a common rule, directors are considered independent if they are not currently 
employed by the firm or if a gap of three years has elapsed since previous employment there, 
and if they have neither financial nor business ties to the firm (see Swiss Code).2 
The call for independent directors launched in the United States has led to the appointment 
of directors who have neither financial nor personal relations to the firm. In consequence, 
independent "professional" directors may engage in a significant number of other outside 
activities (for example, outside directorships, executive positions or political engagements), 
assuming that a directorship is generally not a full-time job. 
Therefore, the second trade-off is characterized by time constraints imposed by competing 
allegiances and conflicts of interest imposed by competing activities, which, however, may 
provide benefits of business experience and external linkages. On the one hand, these outside 
engagements may reduce the time allocated to any single directorship. This, in turn, reduces 
their monitoring capacity and potentially exacerbates the agency problem, raising the agency 
costs that they were employed to reduce in the first place. On the other hand, experienced 
directors with multiple appointments provide important linkages to the external environment. 
In addition, with multiple directorships, directors are not uniquely financially dependent on 
one single seat for remuneration, thus allowing them more scope to voice their views 
independently in discussions in the board room (see von der Crone 2005). Such factors may 
facilitate business in uncertain economic environments. All the same, increasingly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
boards of unregulated firms from 2001 to 2004 (see Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008). Especially small 
firms with traditionally higher proportions of insiders lowered their share. By 2004, only few firms 
still had insider-dominated boards. Besides, board sizes increased due to a higher complexity and 
requirements of the board. As a matter of fact, the fraction of such independent directors has risen 
from 22 percent to 73 percent in the period from 1950 until 2005 in the United States (Gordon 2007). 
Accordingly, the fraction of inside directors or grey directors has decreased to 16 and 11 percent, 
respectively. 
2 In addition, non-independence can also apply to directors with relations to significant shareholders or 
directors with a long tenure (see “Code de Gouvernement d’Entreprise des Sociétés Cotées” in France 
or “Combined Code of Corporate Governance” in the United Kingdom). Firms may also employ 
additional independence criteria. For instance, the Swiss bank UBS employs 13 independence criteria 
based on the Corporate Governance Listing Standards of the New York Stock Exchange for board 
members and 16 for members of the audit committee 
(http://www.ubs.com/1/g/investors/corporategovernance/ independencecriteria.html, access on 
21/02/2011). 
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governance codes recommend restricting the number of external directorships, as is the case 
in the Netherlands or France.3 
In light of regulations and shareholders calling for board independence and a limitation 
regarding the number of outside activities adopted, the question arises whether such rules 
improve the effectiveness of the board and as a result, the value of all firms on average. 
Directors must have the requisite capacity and skill to fulfill their function, and must devote 
the necessary time and effort to the discharge of their duties. From a judicial point of view, 
insufficient effort, skills or time do not release directors from their duty of care. This suggests 
that individuals with multiple board seats encounter serious danger of violating good faith. 
Hence, the examination of these questions has policy implications. A legislation amendment 
for all firms that, however, only improves the corporate governance of specific firms (for 
example large and international banks) may adversely affect and seriously burden all other 
firms since the optimality of board composition is affected by the firm’s requirements (see 
e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Inappropriate rules restrict the freedom of firms to 
organize their board structure according to their needs in a value-maximizing manner. In 
short, corporate governance reforms are only beneficial and welfare-improving if the net-
effect over all firms is positive. 
Therefore, a problem in modern boards lies in the trade-off between board independence 
and the outside activities of independent directors. Current research on the topic fails to 
explicitly connect independence with outside activities. Some do so implicitly by 
investigating the impact of so-called “busy” outsiders on firm performance (Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani 2006). Furthermore, studies use broad 
proxies for either independence or outside activities. And finally, most academic papers focus 
on the U.S. market where ownership is dispersed, requirements for independent directors 
exigent, and a large pool of directors available. 
We address the two issues (independence and outside activities) and examine their effect 
on firm performance in Switzerland. Swiss firms are an interesting research object for two 
reasons. Firstly, the legislature allows insiders to occupy positions on the board of directors, 
as is the case in market-oriented governance systems ("one-tier board structure"). Thus, a 
board can consist of executive directors (insiders), as well as non-executive directors 
(outsiders), and the leadership structure can also be combined (where the CEO is also 
                                                          
3 “Dutch Corporate Governance Code. Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Provisions” 
by the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee and “Recommendations on Corporate Governance” 
by the Association Française de la Gestion Financière. 
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chairman). 4  The Swiss one-tier board structure contrasts the two-tiered board system 
stipulated in Germany (and other continental European countries) which strictly separates the 
supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat") from the management board ("Vorstand"). In a dualistic 
system, no variance in board composition relating to executive directors can be observed, and 
consequently, empirical investigations are not possible. In Switzerland such examinations are 
feasible. 
Secondly, the narrow or illiquid market for directors generates low supply of directors (see 
Loderer and Peyer 2002). A special feature of Switzerland as a small economy is its high 
concentration of large global firms, which used to be controlled by a relatively small number 
of business leaders. The so-called "old boys network" operated through business associations, 
societies, interest groups, political affiliations, and the Swiss Army. Famous examples of 
business leaders include Fritz Gerber, Rainer E. Gut, and Ulrich Bremi. Later, a new group of 
connected directors appeared with the likes of Rolf Hüppi, Andres Leuenberger, and Lukas 
Mühlemann. Nowadays, important business leaders are less active in politics, although many 
politicians are members of politically influenced boards in the utilities and health industry 
sectors. Over the past two decades, the average board size decreased from 15 to 11 board 
members, precipitating a fall in the number of cross-relationships.5 Moreover, Swiss directors 
have been replaced by directors from abroad to some extent. While in 1988, 87 percent of all 
board members were Swiss males, this number gradually decreased to 35 percent in 2012 
(Volonté 2014). Even though some directors are very active today, the network intensity 
cannot be compared to 20 years ago. Further statistical features underline this perception. In 
2008, 1,574 director seats were shared with 1,349 directors. Hence, the ratio of seats to 
directors is 86 percent. In comparison, this ratio was 93 percent for SMI firms in 2012 (and 73 
percent in 1988) (Volonté 2014). 
Our study uses a host of refined variables to measure independence (10 variables) and 
outside activities (11 variables). The definitions go beyond the usual classification of 
independent or “busy” directors made by regulators and academic researchers. This way, we 
aim to explain the inconclusive results of past studies that may have been driven by deficits in 
variable specifications. Furthermore, this breakdown allows us also to examine which factors 
really drive board structure-performance relationships. We tackle endogeneity issues using a 
                                                          
4 CEO duality is given if one person holds both the job of the CEO and the chairman of the board of 
the same firm. 
5 In 2012, only four directors of our sample hold four or more board appointments in Swiss 
Performance Index (SPI) firms. All of them are Swiss, male, and over 50 years old. 
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battery of control variables, fixed effects models and two-stage least squares method. After 
all, our research findings document whether investors trust specific types of directors 
categorized by the extent to which they act in the shareholders’ best interests. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Board of directors should be composed of directors with various functions and skills. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) suggest that directors execute distinct functions on boards. They 
categorize directors’ functions into three board categories: insiders carrying out executive 
functions, independent directors acting in a monitoring capacity, and other directors who are 
instrumentally engaged in providing, for instance, legal counsel. The board’s composition 
should reflect the firm’s needs in relation to the directors’ functions also in relation to their 
independence and external commitments. 
 
2.1 Board Independence 
The effect of board composition (and independence) on firm performance or firm policy 
(namely CEO dismissal) is a topic researched in legal, business, and finance literature. 
Executive directors might face conflicts of interest because their job includes supervising 
themselves, among other things. Thereby, the proportion of insiders or the extent of CEO 
duality is expected to negatively impact firm performance. For this reason, shareholders, 
namely institutional investors, favor independent boards: TIAA-CREF, a large U.S. mutual 
fund, only invests in firms which have a majority of outside directors, and CalPERS, a large 
U.S. pension fund, suggests that the CEO should be the only insider on a board (see Bhagat 
and Black 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008). Furthermore, some U.S. stock exchanges 
such as the NYSE and NASDAQ also require a majority of outside directors; also SOX 
requires independent audit committees. The most obvious problem associated with board 
independence concerns the leadership structure of a firm. CEO duality is fervently debated. 
Dual mandates are widely argued to have a negative impact on firm performance. 
Accordingly, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) demonstrate in an empirical paper that a separation of 
the functions is beneficial for performance. In contrast, Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) 
find evidence that a separation is detrimental to performance, as it is value-decreasing. And 
both Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) and Schmid and Zimmermann (2008) show that neither 
the stock price nor performance is affected by a change in the leadership structure. Faleye 
(2007) explains these results by arguing that the benefits of a separation depend on CEO and 
firm characteristics. 
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From a more general perspective, research on board independence focuses on the 
composition of the board with outside or more strictly, independent directors. Independent 
directors are expected to be more likely to protect the shareholders’ interests than insiders 
would. As evidence of this theory, Weisbach (1988) finds that CEOs of poorly performing 
firms are more frequently removed by outsider-dominated boards than by insider-dominated 
boards. However, several studies find no or a negative relationship between outsiders and 
firm performance (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Yermack 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber 
1996; Klein 1998; Bhagat and Black 1999; Bhagat and Black 2002; Beiner et al. 2006; Bhagat 
and Bolton 2008). 
In contrast, using various identification strategies, Black and Kim (2012) using regulatory 
changes, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) using independent director’s sudden death, and 
Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013) using local director pool find a positive effect of 
board independence on firm value. 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) underline the perception that independent directors represent 
minority shareholders’ interests. In balancing family and minority interests, independent 
directors add value to family firms and limit the family’s opportunity to extract private 
benefits of control. However, independent directors may also have links to the firm and 
management that are not obvious in the first place. For instance, Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy 
(2012) find evidence that analysts who are technically independent are chosen to boards when 
their prior recommendation as analysts were in favor of the firm. 
It is also important to remember that empirical results are prone to be influenced by sample 
firms (namely institutional environment of the country studied, industry affiliation, firm size, 
and ownership structure of the firms) and the period of the study (for example, before or after 
the introduction of SOX, see e.g., Helland and Sykuta 2004). 
 
2.2 Outside Activities of Directors 
The outside activities of directors comprise engagements directors hold outside the specific 
firm board. Expressed in terms of market economics, we expect a growth in directors’ outside 
activities or engagements in case of a seller’s market for directorships. Fama (1980) as well as 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that reliable — "good" — supervisors and managerial talent 
may be rewarded with directorships. However, directors with numerous external 
appointments may have insufficient time for their board duties owing to over-commitment. 
Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find supporting evidence for this view. They reveal that the 
number of additional directorships that a director has declines if the firm faces shareholder 
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class action lawsuits following financial fraud. Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) show that 
shareholders punish lazy directors. Their results indicate that directors are normally elected by 
large majorities with voting rights in excess of 90 percent. In contrast, incumbent directors 
who attend fewer meetings receive fewer shareholder votes (-14 percent). Masulis and Mobbs 
(2014) show that directors devote more time to directorships with higher prestige and 
conclude that reputation plays an important role for independent directors. Similarly, de Jong, 
Hooghiemstra, and van Rinsum (2014) find that intrinsic motives affect a director’s decision 
to join a board. 
Most empirical studies on multiple directorships find that there is a negative relationship 
with firm performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define "busy boards" as being composed 
of a majority of outside directors holding three or more directorships. Their results indicate 
that such boards are negatively related to profitability and market-to-book ratios; additionally, 
CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is lower. Also, Jiraporn et al. (2008) find that 
directors holding multiple board seats negatively affect firm value. In contrast, Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find no evidence that busy directors serve less responsibly 
and therefore reject policies limiting the number of outside directorships. 
Many studies directly link the number of directorships to firm performance, suggesting, for 
instance, that time constraints translate into lower firm valuation. Nevertheless, one important 
question is how multiple directorships affect firm performance. Over-commitment of external 
board members’ has also been shown to be related to valued-decreasing firm strategies (see 
e.g., Jiraporn et al. 2008; Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim 2010). Yermack (2006) demonstrates that 
stock price effects due to major events in one firm are transmitted to other firms that share the 
same director. 
Boards are often composed by external executives, especially CEOs, and politically-
connected people. According to Lorsch and MacIver (1989), managers know best how to 
optimally monitor managers. However, some corporate governance codes recommend a 
maximum number of directorships for executives, and CEOs are less likely to serve on boards 
today than 10 years ago (see Spencer Stuart 2010). 6 One notorious problem again is the 
constraint on time, because CEO positions are demanding and time-consuming. Conyon and 
Read (2006) argue that executives will accept a larger number of outside appointments than is 
optimal for their primary employer. Additionally, conflicts can also occur where directors 
                                                          
6 In Germany, corporate managers should not have more than three supervisory board seats from 
listed firms (“Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex”). In France, executives should not have more 
than four outside directorships (“Code de Gouvernement d’Entreprise des Sociétés Cotées”). 
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represent interests of both supply and demand. Nevertheless, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) 
prove that inside directors with outside directorships are positively related to market-to-book 
ratios and operating performance. In addition, event-studies show that the market reaction on 
the appointment of CEOs (Fich 2005) and executives appointed from firms with low agency 
problems (Perry and Peyer 2005) is positive. In contrast, Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) 
do not find any positive effect of CEOs appointed as outside directors on firm performance. 
Their results depict a negative effect if it is an interlocking CEO. Recurrent findings illustrate 
that regulated firms have more directors with a background in politics and that politicians on 
board have an impact on firm value (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001; Helland and Sykuta 2004; 
Hillman 2005 Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009)).  
In summary, while provisions for independent boards have been launched by investors and 
regulators, the empirical evidence supporting board-performance effects is mixed, whether it 
is concerned with CEO duality or the proportion of independent directors on the board 
(Schmid and Zimmermann 2008; Bhagat and Bolton 2008). With respect to directors’ outside 
activities, our literature review shows that most studies find a negative relationship between 
the number of directorships and firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Jiraporn et al. 
2008). In contrast, the presence of politicians and inside directors with external directorships 
on boards seems to be value-enhancing (Hillman 2005; Masulis and Mobbs 2011). This 
supports the notion that the board can consist of various types of directors. The optimal 
composition of the board may not be equal for every firm, thus calling for a consideration of 
individual firm characteristics.  
 
3. Data Description and Definition of Variables 
The Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance from SIX Swiss Exchange 
requires all listed firms to disclose relevant information about their directors. This information 
includes a curriculum vitae, an outline of the director’s position vis-à-vis the firm, and a list of 
their external professional activities.7 The detailed data provides the basis for this study. 
 
3.1 Data 
All firms of the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) with complete annual reports in 2008 
excluding "investment firms" and "financial services" were targeted. Therefore, the selection 
                                                          
7 "Other activities and functions; For each member of the board of directors: (a) Activities in 
governing and supervisory bodies of important Swiss and foreign organizations, institutions and 
foundations under private and public law; (b) Permanent management and consultancy functions for 
important Swiss and foreign interest groups; (c) Official functions and political posts." (see SIX 
Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance 3.2). 
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bias is negligible (except that non-listed firms are excluded). The sample thus consists of 
1,494 firms whose annual reports enabled us to hand-collect data on 10,683 directors. Cross-
checking the data of directors who hold directorships in two or more listed firms reveals that 
not all annual reports disclose the same information. The details disclosed on multiple 
directorships varied across firms. Some exceptions restrict the disclosure to only relevant 
pieces of information; for example, membership of other listed firms. In consequence, the 
data was aligned where possible. 
 
3.2 Firm Performance: Tobin’s Q 
We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. Our Tobin’s Q is calculated as the total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of total equity divided by total assets (see 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Loderer and Peyer 2002; Beiner et al. 2006). 8 The omitted 
intangible assets in the book value reflect — among other things — the director competence 
or investor confidence in the board’s composition.  
 
3.3 Independence Variables 
Independence variables describe the board’s relation to the firm. As Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2010) point out, outsiders are frequently not really independent, stressing the need 
to account for additional variables of board independence. Independence is the fraction of 
independent directors on the board. Independence defines directors who are neither actual 
Executives, nor Grey (or affiliated) directors. Affiliated directors have current Business 
relationships with the firm or were Former executives of the firm. Additional variables are 
used to classify the director’s Full independence. Long tenure is the fraction of directors with 
tenure longer than nine years such as in the UK’s Combined Code. Blockholding directors is 
the fraction of directors with significant shareholdings (more than three percent of voting 
rights). Finally, Shareholder representatives and Family representatives indicate the fraction 
of directors who represent a shareholder or a family, respectively, other than themselves.  
 
3.4 Outside Activity Variables 
Outside activity variables describe board-member engagements outside the firm. First, the 
aggregate of any board directors’ outside activities (for example, other directorships or 
                                                          
8 In this study, all classes of equity including non-listed equity classes are used for the calculation of the market 
value of equity. The market value of equity is the average stock price 15 days around the last trading day in 
2007, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. 
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engagements in politics or charities) divided by the number of board members is labelled 
Outside activities. SPI directorships denotes all SPI directorships or SPI chairmanships. 
Second, chairmanships (Chairmanships) and directorships (Directorships) measure the total 
number of concurrent (Swiss or foreign) board seats someone holds as chairman or director, 
respectively. If annual reports refer to "various" or "other" directorships, we add a value of 
three. We do not include directorships in subsidiaries. Third, management functions outside 
the board are termed Outside CEO and Outside Officer if the director is also a CEO or an 
officer of another firm, respectively. Finally, non-corporate appointments are also defined. 
Interest groups identifies membership of interest groups (namely chambers of commerce) and 
Political affiliation are actual or former relations to government and political activities. 
Charity is membership of a charity (foundation or non-government organization), Advisory 
signifies advisory services (for example, memberships in scientific research groups), and 
Commission are memberships in commissions (for example, investment commissions). 
 
3.5 Control Variables 
We use several control variables to tackle omitted variable bias. Empirical evidence suggests 
that large, diversified and complex firms have more independent boards, while young, fast-
growing firms have insider-dominated boards (Boone et al. 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang 2008; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 2009). Older firms may have 
more severe agency problems (for example, empire building) while younger firms may 
benefit from lower information costs because firm-specific information is more important to 
them (Raheja 2005; Adams and Ferreira 2007). Furthermore, ownership structure 
characterizes the agency problems within a firm and influences the purpose of the board. For 
instance, the directors appointed to a firm which is controlled by one or a coalition of 
shareholders — as pre-dominant outside Anglo-Saxon countries — have to ensure that 
minority shareholder interests are respected. In some cases, the principal shareholders, the 
directors, and the executive board overlap largely where the standard stipulations on the 
independence of directors may be relaxed. 
We include Board size which is the number of directors on the board (see Yermack 1996). 
Firm age is log of the number of years since the firm’s incorporation plus 1 (see Pugliese and 
Wenstøp 2007). Ownership concentration measures ownership concentration by means of a 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.9 Sales growth is computed as the geometric mean of yearly 
sales growth over 4 periods (see Black and Khanna 2007). Diversification equals 1 if the firm 
has more than one business segment (and 0 otherwise). The corporate center as a business 
segment is excluded. This may be relevant since, according to Anderson et al. (2000), 
diversified firms have more outside directors. Firm size is log of the firm’s total assets (total 
liabilities plus shareholder’s equity) (Yermack 1996). Finally, we include industry and year 
fixed effects. Industries differ in their growth opportunities, competition, and industry 
regulation which all may affect the relationship between boards and firm performance (see 
e.g. Kole and Lehn 1999; Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian 2002; Boone et al. 2007).  
 
3.6 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables applied in this study. The first set of 
variables, the "independence variables", depicts that, on average, three quarters of the board 
members are independent, and 10 percent are executive directors. Both, former executives and 
directors with business relations make up around 7 percent of the directorships. Grey directors 
account for 14 percent of all directorships. The second set of variables, the "outside activity 
variables", presents the average number of outside engagements per director. In the mean 
board, each director has 3.51 outside appointments (total outside activities), but only 0.36 
appointments in SPI boards. Hence, such SPI directorships represent about 16 percent of all 
directorships (= SPI directorships / (Chairmanships + Directorships)). 17 percent of all 
directors hold outside CEO positions, 25 percent outside executive officer positions, and 12 
percent have political affiliations. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The relationships between Tobin’s Q and both Independence and Total outside activities are 
illustrated in Figure 1. The chart indicates that Tobin’s Q is higher for firms in the lowest 
percentile group of both Independence and Total outside activities than for firms in the 
highest group. The figure suggests that higher independence and more outside activities are 
related to lower firm performance. However, the figure must be interpreted with care since 
omitted variables and other endogeneity issues are likely to drive these results. 
                                                          
9 The index can assume values between 0 and 1. In the one extreme case, if the index is 1, all votes are 
combined in only one voting block where one has 100 percent of the voting rights. Conversely, if the 
index is 0, then no one owns significant voting rights (over three percent). 
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<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Our sample consists of 10,683 directorships of which 871 are held by executive directors. 
These directors exhibit different characteristics in comparison to non-executive directors.  
Table 4 presents statistical evidence that executive directors hold significantly fewer positions 
outside the firm in comparison to non-executive directors. Calling for more board 
independence will therefore potentially lead to boards’ composed by directors who hold 
significantly more engagements. Furthermore, executive directors are younger, male and more 
likely to be foreigners than non-executive directors on average. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
We evaluate the effect of board independence and outside activities on firm performance in 
several steps. Firstly, we use pooled ordinary least squares regression models with White 
(1980). We control for time trends using year dummies and for time-varying firm 
characteristics using a set of control variables. Secondly, we estimate the models with 
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors and cluster-robust standard errors. In addition, we use 
Fixed effects models to account for omitted variable bias. Thirdly, we tackle reverse causality 
with 2SLS. Fourthly, we examine the impact of the overall board structure on firm 
performance and decompose board independence and outside activities into several sub-
elements. Finally, we assess the board’s impact on board meetings. 
 
4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Models 
Table 3 presents the relation between independence and outside activity and Tobin’s Q using 
pooled OLS regression models. Surprisingly, board independence is significantly negatively 
related to Tobin’s Q (Column I). In contrast, there is no significant relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and total outside activities (Column II). The same results hold when the effects of 
independence and outside activities on Tobin’s Q are simultaneously estimated because 
independent boards are likely to be externally active boards (Column III). 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
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4.2 Pooled, fixed and random effects regression models 
In the next step, we estimate the models using standard errors that are potentially better suited 
to the dataset. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors account for cross-sectional and serial 
correlation whereas cluster-robust Huber/White standard errors treat each firm as a cluster and 
account for within-firm correlation of the error terms. However, the results remain the same 
as when White (1980) standard errors are used (Table 4, Column I and II).  
Endogeneity issues present several problems in corporate governance studies.10 Panel data 
enables tackling omitted variable bias by the use of firm fixed effects. Fixed effects control 
for time-invariant and unobserved firm characteristics. Therefore, within-firm changes are 
used to explain variation in the dependent variable (see e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2008). 
Indeed, several tests (Wooldridge's test [Wooldrige 2010], F test, Lagrange multiplier test) 
suggest that unobserved effects are important and that the models should be estimated using 
fixed effects. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 4, Column III, indicates that board independence is no longer significantly related with 
Tobin’s Q when firm fixed effects are included. However, corporate governance arrangements 
often change very slowly over time which poses problems when using fixed effects (see e.g. 
Gompers et al. 2003). Time variation for both independence and outside activity is indeed 
very low. The lagged variables of independence and total outside activities explain 79% and 
88% respectively of their variation.  
An alternative method is the use of Random effects models. Random effects models 
correct for within-firm correlation and the firm-specific effect is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variable. However, Hausman (1978) test suggests that fixed effects models are 
preferred over random effects models.  
Not only is the use of fixed effects problematic in cases where the variables of interest are 
quasi time-invariant, they also do not solve the causality problem. Independence and outside 
activities are still seen as exogenously determined. 
 
                                                          
10 Endogeneity occurs in the presence of omitted variables bias, selection bias, misspecified or erroneous 
variables, measurement errors, and joint simultaneity. 
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4.3 Instrumental Variables 
Instrumental variables using 2SLS are commonly used to tackle causality problems (see e.g. 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). However, this method requires valid instruments. 11  Valid 
instruments must be relevant and exogenous. Relevant instruments are significantly correlated 
with the endogenous variable conditional on the other variables (relevance condition). 12 
Exogenous instruments requires that they are determined outside of the model and not 
correlated with the error (exclusion condition). Hence, the selection of valid instruments is not 
trivial, especially in the context of corporate governance. The difficulty arises because 
variables that are related with the endogenous (governance) variable are most often other 
potential control variables. In addition, there were no fundamental legal changes in 
Switzerland during 2005 to 2012 which often serve as instruments (see e.g., Black, Jang and 
Kim 2006; Black and Kim 2012). 
Our instruments are based on the reflections of Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013). 
They use the local supply of directors (measured as the number U.S. nonfinancial firms 
headquartered near the firm) as an instrument for independence. Board independence is higher 
when the pool of potential directors is larger. However, in this study, we use dummy variables 
for 10 different regions in Switzerland according to where the firm’s headquarters are 
located. 13  These regions include urban and rural/peripheral and central areas and cover 
different cultures (three different languages: German, French, and Italian; and two religions: 
Protestantism and Catholic). One third of the Swiss are living in the five largest 
agglomerations (Basel, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne and Zurich) and important international 
airports are located in Basel, Geneva and Zurich which potentially increases the international 
director pool. Furthermore, the overlap of people involved in political, economic, cultural 
activities and charity work is larger in some regions than in others which potentially affect the 
number of outside activities. Hence, economic, cultural and network effects are likely to 
affect in various degrees both board independence and total outside activity of directors. High 
                                                          
11 As an example of reverse causation, think of a highly valued firm. Such a firm may be attractive to 
independent directors. In addition, this firm may have privileged resources and is not in need to seek 
directors who directly help in dealing with day-to-day business. As a result, a firm with a high Tobin’s 
Q may choose a higher level of board independence, and not vice versa. Similar examples can be 
found for outside activities of board members where casual links cannot directly be established. 
12 So-called "weak instruments" have a low correlation with the endogenous variable; that is, they 
explain only a low variation in the endogenous variable that is not already described by the other 
exogenous variables. If the correlation between the instrument and the regressor is low, the standard 
errors of instrumental variables’ estimators are high (Wooldridge 2010). Hence, an instrument must be 
significantly related to the endogenous variable in the reduced form. 
13 Basel (205), Bern (98), Central Switzerland (174), Geneva (90), Lausanne (98), Mittelland (93), St. 
Gallen (59), Ticino (21), Zurich (418) and other (238). 
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F statistics of 53.8 for Independence and 77.8 for Total outside activities indicate the 
relevance of these instruments. 
Furthermore, regional effects are most likely to be exogenous. Firstly, there are no 
arguments that the firm’s headquarters influences a firm’s performance. There are industrial 
clusters in some regions such as the financial centers in Zurich or Geneva or the 
pharmaceutical industry in Basel. However, industry effects are likely to absorb this 
correlation. Secondly, relocations of headquarters are very rare and happen only in very 
unusual circumstances. Almost all firms have been headquartered at the same place since their 
incorporation, therefore before their listing on the stock exchange and before directors have 
been selected. In addition, no firm is selling their products only locally and could therefore be 
affected by economic conditions in their region. After all, regional dummies do only affect 
firm performance via board composition. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 5 shows first-stage regressions where regional dummies are included (Column I and II). 
We exclude year fixed effects from the first-stage regressions since corporate governance 
structures (including Independence and Total outside activities) are quasi time-invariant, 
especially in the period from 2005 to 2012. The results indicate that neither Independence nor 
Total outside activities is significantly related with Tobin’s Q. However, the results depend on 
the validity of the instruments chosen and therefore, further examination of board 
independence and external commitments are needed. 
 
4.4 Independence and Outside Activities Re-Examined 
We next investigate which factors in a board’s independence and in directors’ outside 
activities affect firm performance. 
Table 6 indicates that one-tier boards are positively related with Tobin’s Q. We define 
One-tier boards as having at least one executive director (insider) on the board, while two-tier 
boards are defined as boards which have no executive directors on the board at all. Hence, the 
CEO is most likely to be a board member in a one-tier board system. Therefore, we evaluate 
the leadership structure in the next step. CEO is chairman is 1 if the chairman serves also as 
CEO of the firm (and 0 otherwise), and CEO is director is 1 if the CEO is an ordinary 
member of the board (and 0 otherwise). The results in Columns II and III reveal a positive 
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relationship when the CEO is present on the board as an ordinary board member and no 
relationship in case of CEO duality. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Subsequently, we decompose Independence and Total outside activities into sub-variables 
separately (Table 7 and Table 8). Firstly, we evaluate the components of board independence 
and examine in total 9 different variables. We include Total outside activities as a control. 
Hereby, Table 7, Column I and III, exhibits a positive and significant relationship of 
Executives and Former executives with firm performance. Executive directors (and former 
executives) may be closer to new industry trends and technologies than industry veterans or 
directors unfamiliar with the industry. Business relationships turn out to be unimportant in 
this regard. Family representatives on the board depicts a positive relationship. In contrast, 
more classical definitions such as Grey directors or Full independence are not significantly 
related to Tobin’s Q. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Secondly, we conduct the same procedure for outside activity. The number of all Total 
outside activities is split into 9 sub-variables. Similarly to above, we include Independence as 
a control. Table 9, Column I, presents variables that are related to executive activities. The 
results demonstrate that, while Executives is still positively associated with firm performance, 
executive positions outside the firm (both as outside CEO positions and outside officer 
positions) depict a negative relationship. Seemingly, investors question the due diligence of 
executives from firms other than their own. In contrast, there is a positive relationship 
between Chairmanships and Tobin’s Q. All other external commitments, including SPI 
directorships which counts only directorships in listed Swiss firms and circumvents a bias in 
disclosure practice, are not significantly related to Tobin’s Q (Columns II, III, and IV). 
 
<INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
 
4.5 Board Meetings 
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As mentioned before, board independence or outside activities may be indirectly related to 
Tobin’s Q. The status of board members vis-à-vis the firm and their activities outside the 
board room can affect the time committed to the board. Vafeas (1999) reasons that meetings 
proxy for internal activity of the board. Jiraporn et al. (2009) show that directors with outside 
directorships are more frequently absent from meetings than others. For these reasons and 
given that independence is a measure of monitoring capacity, it can be expected that board 
independence and board internal activity are positively related. By contrast, if directors with 
outside activities do not devote enough time to the board, this variable should be negatively 
associated to board activity. 
In order to test these questions empirically, we employ Poisson regressions with the Total 
number of all board meetings (including committee meetings) or the Total hours of all board 
meetings as its dependent variables. These are regressed on Full independence, Executives, 
Total outside activities, and SPI directorships. As a control variable, the Number of board 
committees is employed. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 9 displays summary statistics of meeting variables. In total and on average, board 
members met 17.61 times in one year, which gives a total board time of 71.38 hours. In 
comparison, the number of ordinary board meetings (excluding committee meetings) is 7.254 
on average (median: 6), and the average length of an ordinary meeting is 5.522 hours 
(median: 5). The sample of Vafeas (1999) depicts 7.45 meetings on average. The results in 
Table 10 indicate that board membership of executive directors (insiders) is negatively related 
to board frequency and meeting duration, while the number of all outside activities, on 
average, positively affects the number of meetings, but negatively (insignificantly) affects the 
duration of all aggregated meetings. This suggests that meetings are not as necessary if there 
are more executive directors on the board. Insiders may use other opportunities to discuss the 
business processes. Furthermore, information may be transmitted more easily between the 
management and a board consisting of insiders, which reduces the need for meetings. The 
second result indicates that directors with outside activities are highly professional, indicating 
19 
 
 
that they take board work seriously. Their seriousness may explain the number of outside 
activities they have on average. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The degree of independence and the number of outside activities of board members have been 
the subject of a broad range of empirical research. However, board independence is a vague 
term and hence a difficult descriptor for the board structure. The same is true for proxies of 
the board members’ outside activities. Over the past few years, critics of firm governance 
have petitioned to promote an increased presence of independent directors on boards. Hence, 
they implicitly state that fewer independent directors hamper effective monitoring. In the 
words of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), such commentators believe that boards are out of 
equilibrium and have to be adjusted in the shareholders’ interest. Similarly, there is growing 
criticism regarding board members with multiple outside activities. These two issues are 
further complicated by the fact that they appear to be interrelated. The call for independent 
directors has led to an increasing number of ’professional’ (outside) directors engaging in 
various outside activities.  
Our results neither indicate that independence is positively related to Tobin’s Q nor that 
external commitments are negatively related to it. Nevertheless, specific definitions of 
independence and outside activities do indicate significant relations. Executive directors and 
former executives are positively related to firm performance, while outside executives are 
negatively related to it. Furthermore, the relationship between representatives of family 
shareholders and firm value is positive. Investors seem to trust these directors more, which, in 
turn, results in higher firm valuation. Moreover, the frequency and duration of meetings is 
negatively affected by insiders because in some cases there may be more efficient ways of 
communication and decision making. Altogether, we find no strong empirical evidence that a 
higher proportion of independent directors or the number of outside activities would affect 
firm value. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Median Min  Max s.d. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of firms 1,494 178 184 191 194 191 191 185 180 
Performance variable 
             Tobin's Q 1.56 1.26 0.74 4.49 0.78 1.61 1.82 1.78 1.28 1.49 1.61 1.42 1.49 
Independence variables 
             Independence 0.76 0.80 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 
Full Independence 0.46 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Grey 0.14 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 
Executives 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Former executives 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Business relationships 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Long tenure 0.28 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Blockholding directors 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Shareholder representatives 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Family representatives 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Outside activity variables 
            Total outside activities 3.51 3.33 0.00 13.33 1.65 3.41 3.44 3.41 3.47 3.53 3.59 3.59 3.61 
SPI directorships 0.36 0.29 0.00 1.80 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.30 
Chairmanships 0.53 0.43 0.00 4.00 0.46 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.50 
Directorships 1.69 1.57 0.00 7.33 1.00 1.65 1.68 1.65 1.67 1.68 1.73 1.71 1.72 
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Outside CEO positions 0.17 0.14 0.00 1.25 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 
Outside officer positions 0.25 0.20 0.00 1.25 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30 
Interest group members 0.24 0.17 0.00 1.43 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Politically affiliated members 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Charity members 0.32 0.17 0.00 3.13 0.45 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 
Advisory appointments 0.17 0.08 0.00 1.83 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 
Commission members 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Control Variables 
            Board size 7.1 7.0 2.0 20.0 2.7 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.1 
Firm age (years) 74.7 58.0 1.0 494.0 62.7 75.9 74.8 73.4 73.1 73.9 74.9 74.8 76.8 
Ownership concentration 0.19 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 
Sales Growth 0.05 0.03 -0.32 1.53 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Diversification 0.71 — — — 0.45 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 
Firm size (in Millions CHF) 26,630 873 0 2,393,000 160,241 29,220 30,570 29,940 26,540 23,160 23,210 25,180 25,420 
NOTE. ― The sample consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. The table presents mean, median, minimum (Min), maximum (Max), and standard deviation (s.d.) for 
each variable. 
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Table 2 
DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
All 
Executive 
Directors 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
 Observations 10,683 871 9,812 t-test/ 
in % 100.00% 8.15% 91.85% (Wilcoxon-test) 
Age 57.7 54.5 58.0 *** / (***) 
Tenure 7.6 9.5 7.4 *** / (***) 
Female 6.7% 3.8% 7.0% *** / (***) 
Foreigner 27.9% 34.9% 27.3% *** / (***) 
Total outside activities 3.6 2.1 3.8 *** / (***) 
SPI directorships 0.4 0.2 0.4 *** / (***) 
Chairmanships 0.5 0.3 0.6 *** / (***) 
Directorships 1.7 1.0 1.7 *** / (***) 
Outside CEO positions 0.2 0.1 0.2 *** / (***) 
Outside officer positions 0.2 0.1 0.3 *** / (***) 
Interest group members 0.3 0.2 0.3 *** / (**) 
Politically affiliated members 0.1 0.1 0.2 *** / (***) 
Advisory appointments 0.2 0.1 0.2 ** / (***) 
Commission members 0.0 0.0 0.0 ** / (***) 
Blockholding directors 5.7% 24.1% 4.1% *** / (***) 
Family representatives 7.1% 18.4% 6.1% *** / (***) 
Shareholder representatives 14.3% 8.6% 14.8% *** / (***) 
NOTE. ― The table presents comparisons between executive directors and non-executive directors 
boards. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction and 
the quality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 3 
INDEPENDENCE AND OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES 
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  
Variables (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 (Intercept) 1.50436 (**) 1.28808 (**) 1.50312 (**) 
 
(0.592) 
 
(0.590) 
 
(0.592) 
 Independence -0.50733 (***) 
  
-0.49849 (***) 
 
(0.194) 
   
(0.185) 
 Total outside activities 
 
-0.01759 
 
-0.00604 
 
   
(0.023) 
 
(0.022) 
 log Board size 0.11499 
 
0.03938 
 
0.11216 
 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.122) 
 log Firm age -0.02558 
 
-0.03077 
 
-0.02454 
 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 Ownership concentration -0.17339 
 
-0.13441 
 
-0.16839 
 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.170) 
 Sales Growth 0.14469 
 
0.20396 
 
0.14667 
 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.194) 
 Diversification -0.17819 
 
-0.19798 (*) -0.17945 
 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.113) 
 log Firm size 0.02925 
 
0.03050 
 
0.03063 
 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.031) 
 Industry included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Year included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Multiple R2 0.3341 
 
0.3204 
 
0.3342 
 Adjusted R2 0.3274 
 
0.3140 
 
0.3273 
 F-statistic 25.3 *** 23.8 *** 24.5 *** 
NOTE. ― The table presents pooled OLS regression coefficient estimates for 
independence and outside activity variables. The sample consists of 1,494 firm-year 
observations. White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 4 
POOLED, FIXED, AND RANDOM EFFECTS: INDEPENDENCE AND OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES 
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 Variables (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III)  (IV) 
(Intercept) 1.50312 (***) 1.50312 (***)   2.63229 (***) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.245) 
 
  (0.466)  
Independence -0.49849 (***) -0.49849 (***) 0.00812  -0.12221  
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.100)  (0.097)  
Total outside 
activities 
-0.00604 
 
-0.00604 
 
0.00344 
 
0.00989  
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.018)  (0.016)  
log Board size 0.11216 (**) 0.11216 
 
-0.00502  0.01520  
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.075)  (0.073)  
log Firm age -0.02454 
 
-0.02454 
 
-0.40280 (***) -0.06138  
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.096)  (0.039)  
Ownership 
concentration 
-0.16839 (*) -0.16839 (*) 1.12112 (***) 0.56051 (***) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.195)  (0.152)  
Sales Growth 0.14667 
 
0.14667 
 
0.19723 (**) 0.14676 (*) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.081)  (0.081)  
Diversification -0.17945 (***) -0.17945 (***) -0.40450 (**) -0.17285 (*) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.190)  (0.092)  
log Firm size 0.03063 (**) 0.03063 (**) -0.30917 (***) -0.06894 (***) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.035)  (0.023)  
Industry included 
 
included 
 
excluded  included  
Year included 
 
included 
 
included  included  
Multiple R2 0.3342 
 
0.3342 
 
0.2676  0.2265  
Adjusted R2 0.3273 
 
0.3273 
 
0.2288  0.2218  
F-statistic 24.5 *** 24.5 *** 31.1 *** 14.3 *** 
Method Pooling 
 
Pooling 
 
Two-ways 
Fixed effects 
 Random  
Standard errors 
Driscoll–
Kraay  
Cluster-robust 
Huber/White  
Cluster-robust 
Huber/White 
 
Cluster-robust 
Huber/White 
 
NOTE. ― The table presents regression coefficient estimates for independence and outside activity variables. The 
sample consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. Driscoll-Kraay (1998) or cluster-robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 5 
2SLS: INDEPENDENCE AND OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES 
 
First stage 
 
Second stage 
  Dependent Variables  
 
Independence  Total outside activities  Tobin's Q  
 (I)  (II)  (III)  
Method 0.50847 (***) 0.18318 
 
1.29841 (***) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.589) 
 
(0.339) 
 Tobin's Q -0.03879 (***) -0.05452 
   
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.058) 
   Independence 
  
1.51441 (***) -0.08583 
 
   
(0.205) 
 
(0.521) 
 Total outside activities 0.02386 (***) 
  
0.04496 
 
 
(0.003) 
   
(0.053) 
 log Board size 0.15827 (***) -0.64336 (***) 0.06787 
 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.101) 
 log Firm age 0.01235 (**) 0.16830 (***) -0.04162 (*) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.024) 
 Ownership concentration -0.05614 (**) 0.86007 (***) -0.18595 (*) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.102) 
 Sales Growth -0.09093 (***) 0.24572 
 
0.18404 
 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.117) 
 Diversification 0.02626 (**) -0.20103 (**) -0.18512 (***) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.049) 
 log Firm size -0.00421 
 
0.27125 (***) (0.016) 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.019) 
 Regions included 
 
included 
 
excluded 
 Industry included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Year excluded 
 
excluded 
 
included 
 Multiple R2 0.2802 
 
0.2436 
 
– 
 Adjusted R2 0.2740 
 
0.2382 
 
– 
 F-statistic 17.8 (***) 14.7 (***) – 
 NOTE. ― The table presents first-stage and 2SLS regression coefficient estimates for independence and 
outside activity variables. The sample consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 6 
BOARD STRUCTURE 
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 Variables (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 (Intercept) 1.23281 (***) 1.27415 (***) 1.23268 (***) 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.244) 
 One tier 0.09194 (**) 
    
 
(0.038) 
     CEO duality 
  
0.04301 
   
   
(0.055) 
   CEO is director 
    
0.14126 (***) 
     
(0.047) 
 Total outside activities -0.01488 
 
-0.01761 
 
-0.01473 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 log Board size 0.03335 
 
0.04390 
 
0.01604 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.069) 
 log Firm age -0.02741 
 
-0.03063 
 
-0.02518 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 Ownership concentration -0.14008 
 
-0.13491 
 
-0.12958 
 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091) 
 Sales Growth 0.18813 (*) 0.20817 (**) 0.16114 
 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.102) 
 Diversification -0.19088 (***) -0.19678 (***) -0.18253 (***) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 log Firm size 0.03167 (**) 0.03023 (**) 0.03370 (**) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 Industry included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Year included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Multiple R2 0.3231 
 
0.3207 
 
0.3245 
 Adjusted R2 0.3164 
 
0.3140 
 
0.3178 
 F-statistic 23.3 *** 23.0 *** 23.4 *** 
NOTE. ― The table presents regression coefficient estimates for board structure 
variables. The sample consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. Cluster-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 7 
INDEPENDENCE 
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 Variables (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 
(IV) 
 (Intercept) 0.83070 (***) 1.27120 (***) 0.95666 (***) 1.33590 (***) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.247) 
 Executives 0.89878 (***) 
  
0.92266 (***) 
  
 
(0.131) 
   
(0.131) 
   Former executives 0.69156 (***) 
  
0.65489 (***) 
  
 
(0.150) 
   
(0.151) 
   Business relationships -0.18005 
   
-0.12241 
   
 
(0.136) 
   
(0.136) 
   Grey 
  
0.13370 
     
   
(0.110) 
     Long tenure 
    
-0.13893 (*) 
  
     
(0.072) 
   Blockholding directors 
    
-0.13814 
   
     
(0.149) 
   Shareholder representatives 
    
-0.10157 
   
     
(0.095) 
   Family representatives 
    
0.40055 (***) 
  
     
(0.122) 
   Full Independence 
      
-0.09892 
 
       
(0.076) 
 Total outside activities 0.00641 
 
-0.01630 
 
0.00390 
 
-0.01518 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.011) 
 log Board size 0.13911 (**) 0.05103 
 
0.16366 (**) 0.04225 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.069) 
 log Firm age -0.02942 
 
-0.03186 (*) -0.02180 
 
-0.03136 (*) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 Ownership concentration -0.16874 (*) -0.13361 
 
-0.17613 (*) -0.17097 (*) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.095) 
 Sales Growth 0.18162 (*) 0.19021 (*) 0.18654 (*) 0.19391 (*) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.101) 
 Diversification -0.15018 (***) -0.19756 (***) -0.15051 (***) -0.19290 (***) 
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(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 log Firm size 0.03132 (**) 0.02924 (**) 0.02147 
 
0.03157 (**) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 Industry included 
 
included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Year included 
 
included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Multiple R2 0.3476 
 
0.3211 
 
0.3571 
 
0.3212 
 Adjusted R2 0.3400 
 
0.3144 
 
0.3483 
 
0.3145 
 F-statistic 24.3 *** 23.1 *** 22.5 *** 23.1 *** 
NOTE. ― The table presents regression coefficient estimates for independence variables. The sample 
consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 8 
OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES 
Independent Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
 Variables (I) 
 
(II) 
 
(III) 
 
(IV) 
 (Intercept) 1.66954 (***) 1.50640 (***) 1.62127 (***) 1.49788 (***) 
 
(0.250) 
 
(0.245) 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.245) 
 Outside CEO positions -0.13211 
   
-0.17377 (*) 
  
 
(0.098) 
   
(0.100) 
   Outside officer positions -0.27637 (***) 
  
-0.25438 (***) 
  
 
(0.084) 
   
(0.085) 
   Chairmanships 
  
0.07220 (*) 0.07122 (*) 
  
   
(0.040) 
 
(0.042) 
   Directorships 
  
-0.01104 
 
-0.00894 
   
   
(0.019) 
 
(0.020) 
   Interest group members 
    
0.01378 
   
     
(0.072) 
   Politically affiliated members 
   
0.00090 
   
     
(0.130) 
   Charity members 
    
-0.01044 
   
     
(0.046) 
   Advisory appointments 
    
0.00012 
   
     
(0.073) 
   Commission members 
    
-0.24031 
   
     
(0.151) 
   SPI directorships 
      
-0.02503 
 
       
(0.057) 
 Independence -0.50915 (***) -0.51596 (***) -0.51386 (***) -0.49741 (***) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.092) 
 log Board size 0.11641 (*) 0.12508 (*) 0.11039 
 
0.10873 
 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.071) 
 log Firm age -0.01972 
 
-0.02317 
 
-0.01704 
 
-0.02490 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.019) 
 Ownership concentration -0.18786 (**) -0.18238 (**) -0.16573 (*) -0.17582 (*) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.090) 
 Sales Growth 0.13568 
 
0.15534 
 
0.15408 
 
0.14475 
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(0.100) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.100) 
 Diversification -0.18005 (***) -0.18410 (***) -0.19320 (***) -0.17891 (***) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.045) 
 log Firm size 0.02169 
 
0.02674 (*) 0.02433 (*) 0.03068 (**) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
 Industry included 
 
included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Year included 
 
included 
 
included 
 
included 
 Multiple R2 0.3394 
 
0.3356 
 
0.3422 
 
0.3342 
 Adjusted R2 0.3321 
 
0.3284 
 
0.3333 
 
0.3273 
 F-statistic 24.2 *** 23.8 *** 19.9 *** 24.5 *** 
NOTE. ― The table presents regression coefficient estimates for independence variables. The sample 
consists of 1,494 firm-year observations. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 9 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF MEETING VARIABLES 
   
Correlation matrix 
Variable Mean Median 
Full 
independence 
Executives Total outside 
activities 
SPI 
directorships 
Total number of all board meetings 17.610 15.000 
    Total hours of all board meetings 71.380 66.500 
    Full independence 0.351 0.286 1 
   Executives 0.114 0.000 -0.34*** 1 
  Total outside activities 3.366 3.143 0.17* -0.27*** 1 
 SPI directorships 0.387 0.333 0.22** -0.27*** 0.15* 1 
Number of board committees 2.025 2.000 
    NOTE. ― The basis sample consists of 155 (and 94) observations. The table presents mean, median, minimum (Min) 
and maximum (Max) for each variable. 
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
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Table 10 
BOARD MEETINGS 
Independent Dependent Variable 
 Variables Total number 
of all board 
meetings 
 
Total hours 
of all board 
meetings 
 
 
(I) 
 
(II) 
 (Intercept) 2.24955 (***) 3.79028 (***) 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.169) 
 Full independence 0.04341 
 
0.05928 
 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.167) 
 Executives -1.14487 (***) -0.95881 (**) 
 
(0.284) 
 
(0.440) 
 Total outside activities 0.05096 (***) -0.02261 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.028) 
 SPI directorship -0.23390 (**) 0.14082 
 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.112) 
 Number of board committees 0.24556 (***) 0.22728 (***) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.047) 
 McFadden R2 0.18546 
 
0.18835 
 AIC 1094.8 
 
1586.2 
 Observations 155 
 
94 
 The table presents Poisson regression coefficient estimates for board 
independence and outside activities. The sample consists of 155 (and 94) 
SPI firm observations in 2008.  
* p < .10. 
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01. 
 
 
